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CHILD RAPE, MORAL OUTRAGE, AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY 
Susan A. Bandes* 
Is raping a child as heinous an act as taking a life?  How should the 
comparative moral depravity of child rapists and murderers be measured?  
By what metric can the irrevocable harm murder inflicts on its victims be 
weighed against the long-term anguish inflicted on child rape victims?  
What is the judicial role in gauging the societal outrage and revulsion eli-
cited by these two crimes, and in determining whether the death penalty is 
an appropriate response to those emotions? 
In Kennedy v. Louisiana1 the Supreme Court struggled with this daunt-
ing set of issues, which called for judgments that are inescapably moral and 
emotional.  The Court also faced contentious questions about the nature and 
longevity of the psychological injuries to child rape victims and to their 
families,2 about whether a capital prosecution would ameliorate or exacer-
bate those harms,3 and about whether the strong emotions jurors feel in 
child rape cases are likely to overwhelm their capacity to decide fairly.4  
The Kennedy decision is a vivid illustration of the central point Douglas 
Berman and Stephanos Bibas make in Engaging Capital Emotions: that it is 
impossible to evaluate the legal issues raised by capital punishment without 
addressing the role of emotion.5 
I‘ve argued that once we acknowledge ―the emotional wellsprings of 
the retributive calculus‖ we can have ―a more clear-eyed debate about retri-
bution‘s proper role in our capital punishment system.‖6  Berman and Bibas 
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drawing support from the widely shared moral outrage the crime evokes, 
and from the crime‘s emotional toll on child rape victims and their families.  
Although I reach the opposite conclusion on the merits, their essay models 
precisely the sort of conversation we ought to be having. 
Part I of this Reply considers the role of emotion in capital jurispru-
dence.  Section A discusses the importance of confronting emotion‘s role in 
capital punishment.  Section B explores the difficulties with using moral 
outrage as a metric.  Section C argues that the penal system should not 
merely reflect moral outrage, but channel and educate it.  Part II focuses on 
the role of emotion in deciding whether child rape should be a capital crime.  
Section A considers the relevance of victim harm to the question facing the 
Kennedy court.  Section B argues that there are three particular problems 
with allowing juries to sentence child rapists to death: the deleterious im-
pact of anger and empathy, the problem of generic prejudice, and the issue 
of race. 
I. EMOTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
A. Why Emotion Must be Part of the Conversation 
As Berman and Bibas argue, it is important to bring emotion into the 
legal conversation for several reasons.  First, emotions help explain why 
people hold the views they do about the death penalty.8  When we engage in 
formulaic, affectless doctrinal discussions of deterrence, retribution, and in-
capacitation,9 we talk past each other and grow increasingly polarized.  
These doctrinal categories have little to do with why people in fact support 
or oppose the death penalty.10  The more we understand about why people 
take the positions they do, and why they adhere to them so vehemently, the 
more likely we are to persuade one another and move toward consensus. 
Second, the capital system—like any legal institution—is premised on 
assumptions about human behavior.  For example, it is built around as-
sumptions about what motivates or deters criminal acts, about how judges 
and jurors decide, and about what victims need.  As I mentioned above, the 
Kennedy opinions are rife with assumptions about human behavior, some-
times backed by empirical evidence, and sometimes not.  When courts pre-
mise decisions on assumptions about human behavior, they ought to 
determine whether the available evidence supports those assumptions. 
The third reason is the most challenging.  Once we acknowledge that, 
as a descriptive matter, emotion pervades the law, we can proceed to the 
necessary normative discussion about which emotions should play roles in 
various legal contexts.  There are many ways to approach this question.  For 
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normatively desirable, such as the debate between Martha Nussbaum and 
Dan Kahan about the role of disgust in criminal law.11  There are psycholog-
ical, sociological, and neuroscientific arguments that certain emotions con-
tribute to better decisionmaking.12  But it is often difficult to navigate 
around what the philosopher Hilary Kornbluth called ―the very hazy border-
line between epistemology and empirical psychology.‖13  That is, what re-
levance does the way we do reason have for the question of how we ought 
to reason?  Does the fact that we feel certain emotions itself demonstrate 
that they deserve respect?14  Philosopher Anthony Appiah aptly describes 
the tension underlying many moral intuition analyses, observing that al-
though we are right to ―complain of normative systems that seem impossi-
bly unmoored from human judgment,‖ we ought not to perpetuate 
objectionable or outmoded intuitive assumptions on the theory that ―what-
ever is, is right.‖15 
Retributive theory tends to straddle this hazy borderline.  Retributive 
arguments often draw support from the fact of the outrage engendered by 
crime, and the fact of the desire to act upon that outrage.  When Berman 
and Bibas refer to retributive anger‘s ―deep roots in the law,‖16 they are in 
part arguing that this retributive emotion deserves respect because it is such 
a basic and longstanding part of any punishment regime.  Their argument is 
also, in part, empirical and pragmatic—an assertion that because the emo-
tion is so entrenched, efforts to squelch it will fail, resulting in distortion, a 
loss of respect for the system, and even vigilante justice.  And finally, their 
argument is explicitly normative.  It is a contention that the legal system 
ought to reflect righteous anger and outrage, as a way of holding a moral 
agent accountable for his crime, expressing the community‘s condemnation, 
and vindicating the victim. 
The relevant question for the legal system is what government actions 
should follow from the fact that certain crimes evoke widespread and in-
tense moral outrage.  Is the depth of the moral outrage a normative argu-
ment for a certain degree of punishment or a certain type of punishment?  
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them, must be evaluated in light of constitutional objectives.  Moreover, as I 
will discuss below, the legal system should not simply reflect or evaluate 
emotional commitments.  It must also channel, shape, and educate them. 
Emotions are not inherently normative.17  Whether they are desirable 
depends on what function they are meant to serve and what goals they are 
meant to attain.  The question is not whether retribution ought to be encour-
aged, or victims ought to be helped to heal, as an abstract matter, but what 
role retribution or healing ought to play in the American system of capital 
punishment.  Under current Eighth Amendment law, capital punishment is 
permitted to the extent it comports with ―the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society,‖18 avoids wanton and unneces-
sary infliction of pain, is proportionate to the severity of the crime, and mi-
nimizes the risk of arbitrary and capricious action.19  Of course, there is 
deep disagreement about the meaning and interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment generally, and about the proper scope and application of these 
constitutional standards.20  Nevertheless, these standards provide the 
framework within which interpretation must take place. 
B. Taking the Measure of Moral Outrage 
Does our understanding of the deep roots of the retributive emotions 
shed light on the questions of proportionality and evolving standards of de-
cency the Court faced in Kennedy?  Do the retributive emotions help us find 
a metric for determining what sorts of crimes, or what sorts of offenders, 
deserve the death penalty? 
Retributivists ―seek[] to punish an offender because she deserves to be 
punished in a manner commensurate with her legal wrongdoing and respon-
sibility . . . .  Not more, not less.‖21  Although this principle has strong intui-
tive appeal,22 it is in danger of being circular and indeterminate—an 
assertion that ―we punish because it is the right thing to do, and we mete out 
the punishment that is right.‖23  Paul Robinson and his coauthors have ex-
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tuitions about how serious punishment ought to be for a range of crimes.  
But Robinson notes that ―modern notions of desert are ordinal rather than 
cardinal.‖24  They tell us where on the continuum punishments should fall, 
but not what types of punishment should bracket the continuum.  In short, 
people share strong intuitions about which crimes deserve the most serious 
punishments, but, at least thus far, the research has no implications for the 
question of what the most serious punishments ought to be.25  As I will sug-
gest shortly, it is plausible that the available punishments frame attitudes 
about appropriate punishment. 
Another difficulty with gauging moral outrage as a measure of proper 
punishment is that people rarely feel one emotion in isolation.  To get at the 
issue of what people want from punishment, it is necessary to examine a 
complex set of emotions.  For example, it is important to disentangle moral 
outrage from fear.  Studies show that when fear of returning the defendant 
to the community is taken out of the equation, and life without parole is of-
fered as an option, support for the death penalty falls significantly.26 
One final difficulty with measuring the retributive urge is that it is not 
static and does not always arise from the bottom up.  The public‘s moral 
outrage not only influences penal policy, but is influenced by it, as I will 
discuss in the next section.  The public‘s level of outrage is also influenced 
by media, political discourse, and all the other factors that routinely inform 
(or misinform) public opinion. 
C. Channeling and Educating Moral Outrage 
Berman and Bibas argue that ―[g]rave moral wrongs demand righteous 
indignation and action,‖ and that the death penalty is a way of 
―[d]enouncing and punishing [child rape] in the strongest possible terms.‖27  
They suggest that since child rape is as terrible a crime as capital murder, 
we ought to express our condemnation by punishing it the same way.  This 
argument assumes that capital punishment is the proper expression of the 
strongest moral outrage. 
My difficulty is with the authors‘ claim that the emotion of moral out-
rage provides support for the death penalty.  It is one thing to say that the 
emotion deserves respect; it is quite another to say that the particular pu-
nishment does.  I will first consider whether an understanding of the retribu-
tive emotions leads to a normative argument for capital punishment.  In the 
next section, I will consider what guidance these emotions offer for the 
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Courts and other legal institutions play a role in guiding public reac-
tions to crime and public expectations about punishment.  The legal system 
is not a mere conduit for outrage.  Rather, it channels outrage, ensuring that 
punishment is proportional and the product of deliberation.  It separates the 
vengeful impulse from the legitimate retributive urge.  Ideally, it ensures 
that serious decisions are not made in the initial stages of grief and fury that 
follow a heinous, high profile crime28 and that all relevant voices are 
heard—even those in danger of being overwhelmed by public outrage. 
Moral outrage does not merely well up from the populace; it takes 
shape in a political and social context.  When respected institutions send the 
insistent message that only the death penalty can truly express appropriate 
condemnation for the most heinous crimes, and that only the death penalty 
can honor the worth of the victims of these crimes, that message has conse-
quences.  It guides the public to feel moral outrage when it is deprived of 
the death penalty.  It creates a set of emotional expectations.  Once the 
death penalty is advertised as a sign of the highest respect for the victim, a 
prosecutor‘s failure to bring capital charges, a jury‘s failure to sentence the 
defendant to death, or the system‘s failure to execute the defendant are 
branded as signs of disrespect for the victim and inadequate moral condem-
nation.29  If child rape is declared a capital crime because of the emotional 
devastation it causes, victims of other serious crimes might reasonably ex-
perience the decision as denigrating the nature and intensity of their suffer-
ing.  They might come to feel that only a capital sentence can properly 
express society‘s condemnation. 
There may be widely shared intuitions about which crimes are the most 
heinous, but the Court and other institutions play an important role in the 
debate about what punishments those heinous crimes deserve.  Studies of 
―anchoring effects‖ suggest that those who define the initial outer bounda-
ries for decisionmaking exert significant influence.30  If life without parole 
were the ultimate punishment, it might be viewed as an appropriate reflec-
tion of moral outrage at the crime and respect for the victim.  The expres-
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available, rather than by imposition of the death penalty per se.  This ques-
tion deserves further study. 
II. EMOTION, CHILD RAPE, AND THE DEATH PENALTY 
In the next two sections, I will address the role of emotion in determin-
ing whether child rape should be a capital crime.  This short Reply is meant 
primarily to address the Berman and Bibas essay, which was written prior 
to the Supreme Court‘s Kennedy decision.  Therefore, I will address the au-
thors‘ arguments in favor of making child rape a capital crime, with refer-
ence to the Kennedy opinion where relevant. 
A. The Relevance of Harm to Victims  
In the Kennedy case, Justice Kennedy acknowledges the anguish child 
rape victims suffer,31 but despairs of ―quantifying‖ this harm in the way one 
can ―quantify‖ the harm caused by murder.32  He rests his distinction be-
tween murder and child rape on the fact that only the former is irrevoca-
ble.33  Justice Alito‘s dissent cites empirical evidence of the grievous and 
often long-term harm caused by child rape in support of his argument that 
Louisiana‘s legislative judgment was not unreasonable.34  Berman and Bi-
bas, too, cite the emotional devastation suffered by victims and their fami-
lies as a compelling reason to treat the most heinous child rapes capitally.  
The focus on harm to victims poses some difficult issues for the criminal 
justice system.  Most centrally, there is profound uncertainty about what 
role the emotional needs of victims ought to play in Eighth Amendment ju-
risprudence. 
Berman and Bibas argue that the grievous harm suffered by child rape 
victims and their families makes child rape a crime worthy of capital pu-
nishment.  In large part their argument is premised on the need for fitting 
retribution for this horrific crime.  In taking the measure of a crime‘s hein-
ousness and a criminal‘s depraved heart, it seems reasonable to ask whether 
it is the sort of crime that is likely to cause long-term harm.  Nevertheless, 
the reliance on predictions of future harm poses some problems for the re-
tributivist rationale. 
Retributive rationales for punishment are generally backward-looking.  
They focus on the crime, or perhaps on the character of the defendant as in-
ferred from the crime.  As Mary Sigler said in explaining why ―pickaxe 
murderer‖ Karla Faye Tucker did not deserve clemency despite her exem-
plary and remorseful conduct during her years on death row: ―[from] the re-
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penalty,35 . . . predictions about an offender‘s future conduct are irrelevant 
to determinations of desert.‖36 
Berman and Bibas defend retributive punishments for child rapists be-
cause of what the future might hold—for both defendants and victims.  
They refer to the possibility of additional abusive acts by the defendant 
against the victim.37  But an argument for capital punishment that relies on 
the future behavior of the defendant for support needs to encompass the 
possibility that the defendant‘s behavior will change in ways that could be 
helpful rather than harmful to the victim and her family.  For example, as 
Justice Kennedy observed, the defendant might come to accept responsibili-
ty and express remorse for the harm he has caused.38  Moreover, their pre-
diction of future harm to victims requires speculation on what victims and 
their families will come to feel with the passage of time.  It is difficult and 
dangerous enough to generalize about what victims need in the present.39  
Predicting how they will feel in the future is an even riskier endeavor.40 
The discussion of victim harm contains some troubling ambiguities for 
the question facing the Kennedy court.  Evidence of future harm might be 
offered as a general measure of the heinousness of child rape—an argument 
that this type of crime is worthy of the harshest form of retribution.  But 
that argument flows almost imperceptibly into another: that the death penal-
ty is needed to help individual victims heal.  For example, Berman and Bi-
bas argue that ―[t]he death penalty unequivocally proclaims society‘s 
empathy and outrage, that these victims bear no blame and need never fear 
that their abusers will repeat or keep exploiting their trauma.‖41  The ques-
tion of whether society has a right to express its moral outrage by executing 
child rapists, however, is not the same as the question of what will help vic-
tims heal. 
Justice Kennedy recognizes this distinction between the needs of socie-
ty and the needs of the victim, suggesting that ―[s]ociety‘s desire to inflict 
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and wrenching capital case might have the effect of inflicting additional 
harm on the child victim.42  Justice Alito dismisses this argument as a policy 
concern irrelevant to the constitutional calculus, asserting that ―the Eighth 
Amendment protects the right of an accused.  It does not authorize this 
Court to strike down . . . laws on the ground that they are not in the best in-
terests of crime victims or the broader society.‖43  Yet if the future wellbe-
ing of victims is at issue,44 surely it is reasonable to seek evidence about 
whether the death penalty will contribute to that wellbeing or detract from 
it. 
The move toward justifying capital punishment based on the emotional 
harm to individual victims creates an additional problem.  It puts courts and 
juries in the position of passing judgment on that harm.  Despite the Su-
preme Court‘s overconfident prediction to the contrary,45 courts have con-
sistently shown themselves unwilling and ill-equipped to regulate the 
admission of victim impact testimony by murder survivors in capital cas-
es.46  It is likely that courts would find evaluating child rape victims‘ testi-
mony about emotional harm at least as unpalatable.  But if capital charges 
and capital sentences are to be determined, in part, by the level of emotional 
devastation to victims, then prosecutors, judges, and juries will indeed need 
to evaluate claims of emotional harm, and defense attorneys will need to re-
fute them.47  This is a prospect that ought to give us pause.48 
 
B. Juror Emotion and Child Rape 
Thus far I have addressed the argument that moral outrage and other 
emotions lend support to making child rape a capital crime.  I now turn my 
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tions of child rape evoke emotions in jurors, prosecutors, judges, and the 
public at large that may interfere with the ability to implement the death pe-
nalty in a constitutionally acceptable manner.  There are three overlapping 
concerns: the problematic role of anger and empathy in this context; the 
problem of generic prejudice; and the issue of race. 
The authors assert that ―legislators, prosecutors, and juries are well 
equipped to decide which child rapes are so heinous as to call for the ulti-
mate punishment.‖49  There is substantial evidence casting doubt on this 
claim.  As Berman and Bibas observe, accusations of child rape evoke un-
derstandable empathy for the victim and rage against the perpetrator.  The 
law needs to make a difficult distinction between taking account of what 
people understandably feel and taking steps to ensure that those feelings 
don‘t adversely affect the fairness of the legal process. 
Empathy and anger are both emotions that can have deleterious effects 
on the operation of the criminal justice system when not properly chan-
neled.  Both of these strong emotions evoke the desire to act.  There is evi-
dence that anger interferes with sound judgment by causing misattributions 
of blame,50 and some evidence that it translates into harsher sentences.51  In 
child sexual abuse prosecutions, this anger is coupled with intense empathy 
for the victim, and this empathy may drive jurors to want to alleviate the 
victim‘s suffering.52  This combination of emotions renders child sexual 
abuse prosecutions particularly vulnerable to distortion and miscarriages of 
justice. 
The concept of ―generic prejudice‖ is useful in understanding one 
source of the concern.  As Neil Vidmar explains, although any case may 
trigger prejudices that interfere with fairness, in some types of cases, the na-
ture of the crime charged evokes prejudice against any person accused of 
committing that crime.53  Generic prejudice implicates the jury‘s ability to 
decide whether a crime occurred or, if it occurred, whether the defendant 
was the perpetrator.  As Vidmar found, generic prejudice is a significant 
problem in child sexual assault cases.54 
The issue was not mere disapprobation or abhorrence of sex abuse but rather 
attitudes and beliefs that bear on the presumption of innocence when a defen-





  Berman & Bibas, supra note 5, at 362. 
50
  Bandes, The Sociology of Emotion, supra note 29, at 21. 
51
  See Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology of Punishment, 
88 CORNELL L.REV. 419, 445–46 (2003) (link). 
52
  See, e.g., DANIEL GOLEMAN, SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE: THE NEW SCIENCE OF HUMAN 
RELATIONSHIPS 96 (2006) (discussing the neural dynamics of empathy and compassion). 
53
  Neil Vidmar, Generic Prejudice and the Presumption of Guilt in Sex Abuse Trials, 21 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 5, 6 (1997). 
54
  Id.  The well known ―moral panics‖ that led to child sexual abuse allegations against hundreds of 
daycare workers in the 1980s are a painful illustration of the results of this dynamic.  See generally 
Bandes, The Lessons of Capturing the Friedmans, supra note 28. 
103:17  (2008) Child Rape, Moral Outrage, and the Death Penalty 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/27/ 27 
against the defendant, substantial numbers of jurors swore under oath that they 
could not be impartial in deciding guilt or innocence and were found partial by 
the triers.55 
Capital sentencing hearings, which focus on the more subjective ques-
tion of whether a defendant deserves to die, raise particular problems in this 
regard.  Jurors may want to ensure that the ultimate punishment available is 
meted out, and that desire may override their ability to determine whether 
the particular defendant deserves to die.  The life and death decision is inhe-
rently moral and emotional, but it must also be particularized.  There is no 
mandatory death penalty for any type of crime, no matter how repugnant.  
The decision must focus on the question of which child rapists deserve to 
die, and there is reason to seriously question the ability of juries to make 
this decision based on constitutionally acceptable criteria.56 
Finally, there is substantial evidence that race can play a distorting role 
in capital murder cases.  As sociologist Craig Haney explains, jurors must 
cross an ―empathic divide‖ in capital cases, and ―in the case of African 
American capital defendants, the empathic divide‖ is especially wide.57  In 
the context of capital murder, a defendant accused of killing a white victim 
is significantly more likely to be capitally charged and sentenced to death 
than one who is accused of killing a black victim.58  As to what would occur 
if capital rape were reinstituted, the evidence about the role of race in capi-
tal rape cases prior to 1977 (when the Court held in Coker v. Georgia that 
the death penalty is a disproportionate sentence for the rape of an adult 
woman59) is not encouraging.  Whatever one might think about the Coker 
decision—and I tend to agree with Berman and Bibas that it is emotionally 
tone deaf on the devastation caused by rape—the Court was facing a partic-
ular problem concerning race, rape, and the empathic divide.  Consider 
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The practice [of executing rapists] originated in the antebellum South, where 
blacks were hanged (and often lynched) for raping white women; ―[n]o white 
rapists are known to have been hanged.‖  Even during the mid-twentieth cen-
tury period ending with the last execution in this country for rape in 1964, over 
89% of those executed for rape were black, while blacks and whites were ex-
ecuted for murder in almost identical numbers.  All fourteen rapists Louisiana 
executed during the 1940‘s and 1950‘s were black.60 
CONCLUSION 
There is ample reason to believe that the legal system should not simp-
ly place its imprimatur on the emotions evoked by child rape.  The better 
path is the one Berman and Bibas recommend (though I would follow it to a 
different destination).  We need to take those emotions very seriously.  We 
also need far more empirical evidence on how a wide range of emotions op-
erate and can be effectively channeled.  Most important, we need to contin-
ue to evaluate the retributive emotions and debate their place in the legal 
system.  Justice Stevens recently protested that our current death penalty ju-
risprudence is the ―product of habit and inattention rather than an accepta-
ble deliberative process.‖61  A broadly acceptable process will be one that 
both respects and evaluates the moral and emotional concerns animating the 
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